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Does It Really Matter?: Making the Case
for a Materiality Requirement in False
Claims to U.S. Citizenship Under the
Immigration and Nationality Act
ELIZABETH MONTANO* & EDWARD F. RAMOS**
Materiality plays an important role in limiting the reach
of laws that penalize misrepresentations. Laws that include
no materiality element punish any covered misrepresentation regardless of its relevance—like lying about hair color
on a loan application. By contrast, laws that include a materiality element withhold punishment for immaterial misrepresentations of that kind—in other words, misrepresentations that have no tendency to affect the ultimate decision.
Our immigration laws make it a deportable offense for a
noncitizen to “falsely represent” herself as a U.S. citizen for
a purpose or benefit under the law. Although this law has
been on the books for decades, a key question about its reach
remains open: Does it include a materiality element? The
Board of Immigration Appeals and three federal circuit
courts have said “yes,” holding that misrepresentations of
U.S. citizenship must be material to trigger deportability.
But in a recent panel decision adopted by the en banc court,
the Eleventh Circuit said “no,” holding that the unambiguous statutory text includes no materiality element.
This Article examines the history of these immigration
statutes and demonstrates why the Eleventh Circuit’s holding was wrong, although mainly for a reason no court has
*
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yet addressed: the common-law origins of the relevant statutory text. Under well-established principles of statutory
construction, Congress is presumed to legislate with the understanding that common-law phrases carry their commonlaw meaning. At common law, the phrase “false representation” carried with it an implicit materiality element. Therefore, the immigration statutes at issue presumptively incorporate materiality because they penalize “false representations” of U.S. citizenship. This presumption is confirmed by
other contextual clues. And, as this Article explains, ensuring fidelity to the statutes’ implicit materiality element is especially important given the statutes’ breadth and the draconian consequences that follow from the Eleventh Circuit’s
contrary holding.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Congress added a pair of provisions to the Immigration
and Nationality Act (the “INA”) that make noncitizens removable
from the United States for falsely claiming U.S. citizenship.1 These
provisions are triggered when a noncitizen “falsely represents” herself as a U.S. citizen “for any purpose or benefit under . . . Federal
or State law.”2
Despite being on the books for nearly a quarter century, a critical
question about these provisions has yet to be definitively answered:
Do immaterial misrepresentations trigger this provision? Or, put differently, will a false representation of citizenship trigger these provisions even if citizenship status has no possible bearing on the purpose or benefit at issue?
The Eleventh Circuit said “yes.”3 In a panel opinion, the Eleventh Circuit held that the unambiguous language of the statute includes no materiality element.4 And the court, sitting en banc in the
same case, reaffirmed that holding.5 As a result, noncitizens whose
immigration cases arise in the Eleventh Circuit are deportable from
the United States for making false representations of U.S. citizenship, even if those representations had no possible legal or practical
impact.6 That holding conflicts with a precedent decision of the
Board of Immigration Appeals (the “BIA”), as well as the law of
three other circuits.7
As this Article will demonstrate, the Eleventh Circuit was
wrong—most obviously for a reason that no court has yet addressed:

1

Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996
(“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 344(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-637 (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), 1227(a)(3)(D)).
2
8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), 1227(a)(3)(D). This Article refers to these
provisions together as the “false-citizenship provisions.”
3
See Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 917 F.3d 1319, 1332 (11th Cir. 2019), aff’d
en banc, 971 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2020).
4
Patel, 917 F.3d at 1332.
5
Patel, 971 F.3d at 1284 (“We need not disturb the panel’s ruling that the
statute lacks a materiality element.”).
6
See id. at 1264–65 (discussing the dissent of one BIA member, which recognized that “Georgia extended driver’s licenses to those with lawful status” and
that the petitioner “did not need citizenship to obtain the license”).
7
See infra Part II.
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the common-law origins of the false-citizenship provisions’ text.8
Specifically, these provisions use a variant of “false representation”—a term long understood to incorporate a materiality element
at common law.9 Under well-established principles of statutory construction, that common-law meaning is incorporated into the statute.10 The Eleventh Circuit’s contrary reasoning is unpersuasive,
and the court was therefore wrong to hold that these important immigration provisions lack a materiality element.
Part I of this Article discusses the history of materiality under
U.S. law, and Part II discusses the history of the INA’s false-citizenship provisions and the jurisprudence establishing that the provisions contain an implicit materiality requirement. Part III summarizes the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Patel v. United States Attorney General11 that the false-citizenship provisions do not contain a
materiality requirement. Part IV concludes this Article by discussing
the flaws in the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning and explaining its detrimental consequences.
I.

A HISTORY OF MATERIALITY IN U.S. LAW AND WHY IT
MATTERS
Materiality limitations have long played a role in common-law
penalties for misrepresentations. For example, as early as the 17th
century, British jurists recognized that the common-law crime of
perjury requires, among other elements, that a false statement be
material to the matter at issue.12 As statutes gradually supplanted the
common law, these materiality limitations were often preserved.13
Many federal statutes thus incorporate a materiality element—from

8

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part I.
10
See LARRY M. EIG, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL97589, STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 3–7 (2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf (discussing how a term’s “accepted meaning governs” when the term has “had an accepted and specialized meaning at
common law”).
11
Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 917 F.3d 1319, 1332 (11th Cir. 2019), aff’d en
banc, 971 F.3d 1258, 1284 (11th Cir. 2020).
12
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 769 (1988).
13
Id. at 769–70.
9
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criminal perjury,14 to securities law,15 to tax law,16 to mail and wire
fraud.17
Immigration law is no exception; a variety of immigration provisions penalizing misrepresentations, including in the denaturalization and visa-application contexts,18 have been understood to incorporate a materiality element.19
In its typical formulation, “a concealment of misrepresentation
is material if it ‘has a natural tendency to influence, or was capable
of influencing, the decision of’ the decisionmaking body to which it
was addressed.”20 While “[m]ateriality can be a subjective and nebulous standard,”21 at base, the requirement ensures that only misrepresentations that actually mattered (or might have mattered) are penalized.

14

See United States v. Mandanici, 205 F.3d 519, 522–23 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1001).
15
See Matrixx Initiatives, Inc. v. Siracusano, 563 U.S. 27, 37 (2011) (discussing 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5(b)).
16
Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U.S. 478, 483–84 (2012) (“[A] violation of [26
U.S.C.] § 7206(1) include[s] . . . that the document in question was false as to a
material matter, [and] that the defendant did not believe the document to be true
and correct as to every material matter . . . .”); Boulware v. United States, 552
U.S. 421, 424 n.1 (2008) (“[P]rovision[] 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1)[] criminalizes the
willful filing of a tax return believed to be materially false.”).
17
See infra Part IV.A.
18
See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 507–08, 507 n.28 (1981)
(discussing the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009
and 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a)).
19
See Chapter 2 - Overview of Fraud and Willful Misrepresentation, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., (Mar. 30, 2021) https://www.uscis.gov/policymanual/volume-8-part-j-chapter-2 (“[M]isrepresentation of a material fact may
lead to . . . adverse immigration consequences.”).
20
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988) (citing Weinstock v.
United States, 231 F.2d 699, 701 (D.C. Cir. 1956)). There are other formulations
of “materiality” as well. See, e.g., id. at 786–87 (Stevens, J., concurring) (describing “materiality” as “distinguish[ing] the trivial from the substantive”). For a discussion of various formulations of materiality and how differences in the formulations can affect a case’s outcome, see Mary C. Stakun, Note, Materiality in the
Denaturalization Context: Kungys v. United States, 23 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 161,
174–79 (1990) (describing the various approaches to materiality of the Justices in
Kungys and illustrating how those approaches might lead to different outcomes).
21
Timothy M. Todd, The Pernicious Effect of Dubious Materiality, 12
LIBERTY U. L. REV. 315, 324 (2018).
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II.

MATERIALITY AND THE INA’S FALSE-CITIZENSHIP
PROVISIONS
Under U.S. immigration law, the Department of Homeland Security may place a noncitizen in removal proceedings if the noncitizen is either “inadmissible” or “deportable” under the INA.22 The
INA uses the term “inadmissible” to refer to noncitizens who have
yet to be legally admitted to the United States.23 In removal proceedings, these noncitizens are subject to “inadmissibility” grounds24
and must prove that they are “admissible” to the United States.25 In
turn, the INA uses the term “deportable” to refer to noncitizens who
have legally entered the United States but who are subject to deportation.26 Unless they are granted discretionary relief, noncitizens
who are inadmissible or deportable can be removed from the United
States.27
In 1996, Congress added a pair of provisions to the INA that
render inadmissible and deportable “[a]ny [noncitizen] who falsely
represents, or has falsely represented, himself or herself to be a citizen of the United States for any purpose or benefit under . . . Federal
or State law.”28 These provisions were added as part of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 199629—
a statute enacted “to improve deterrence of illegal immigration into
the United States . . . by improving the verification system for the

22

See Dakura v. Holder, 772 F.3d 994, 998 n.7 (4th Cir. 2014).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (inadmissibility grounds).
24
Id.
25
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A) (placing the burden of proof on the “applicant
for admission” to prove “clearly and beyond doubt” that she is “not inadmissible
under section 1182” of the INA).
26
8 U.S.C. § 1227 (deportability grounds).
27
8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A) (placing the burden of proof on the government
to “establish[] by clear and convincing evidence that, in the case of a [noncitizen]
who has been admitted to the United States, the [noncitizen] is deportable”). Notably, this Article uses the term “noncitizen” to replace the term “alien.”
28
IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 344(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-637
(codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), 1227(a)(3)(D)). Because the operative
language of the false-citizenship provisions is identical, courts frequently interpret
the provisions in tandem and rely on interpretations of one provision to interpret
the other. See Dakura v. Holder, 772 F.3d 994, 999 (4th Cir. 2014); see also, e.g.,
Ferrans v. Holder, 612 F.3d 528, 531 (6th Cir. 2010).
29
IIRIRA § 334, 110 Stat. at 3009–637.
23
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eligibility for employment.”30 Congress enacted the false-citizenship provisions to “prevent [noncitizens] from taking American
jobs,”31 to discourage noncitizens from “‘abus[ing] . . . the welfare
system’ through fraudulent applications for public benefits,”32 and
to “‘disincentiv[ize] falsely claiming citizenship’ during the employment verification process.”33 Congress, in other words, enacted
these provisions to prevent noncitizens from lying about their citizenship to obtain benefits they were ineligible to receive.
The federal courts and the BIA have both parsed these provisions’ requirements.34 One key aspect they have examined is what
qualifies as a “purpose or benefit . . . under Federal or State law,”
thereby triggering inadmissibility or deportability.35 Courts of appeals have determined that obtaining private-sector employment,36
applying for a U.S. passport,37 and obtaining entry into the United
States38 all qualify as a “purpose or benefit” under the false-citizenship provisions.
In 2010, the Sixth Circuit and Third Circuit issued opinions
seemingly at odds on what counts as a “purpose or benefit.”39 In
Dwumaah v. United States Attorney General, the Third Circuit held
that a noncitizen was deportable under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D) for
30

H.R. REP. No. 104–828, at 199 (1996); see also Castro v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
671 F.3d 356, 368–69 (3d Cir. 2012); Sandoval v. Holder, 641 F.3d 982, 985–86
(8th Cir. 2011).
31
142 CONG. REC. H11080 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith).
32
Id.; Castro, 671 F.3d at 369 (quoting 142 CONG. REC. H11080 (daily ed.
Sept. 25, 1996) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith)).
33
Castro, 671 F.3d at 369 (quoting 142 CONG. REC. 10,030 (1996)); 142
CONG. REC. S4017–18 (daily ed. Apr. 24, 1996) (statement of Sen. Alan Simpson).
34
See, e.g., Theodros v. Gonzales, 490 F.3d 396, 402 (5th Cir. 2007); Matter
of Richmond, 26 I. & N. Dec. 779, 779 (B.I.A. 2016).
35
8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), 1227(a)(3)(D).
36
Theodros, 490 F.3d at 402; Kechkar v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 1080, 1083–84
(10th Cir. 2007); Naser v. Gonzales, 123 F. App’x. 624, 624–25 (5th Cir. 2005)
(per curiam).
37
Sowah v. Gonzales, 196 F. App’x. 576, 577 (9th Cir. 2006).
38
Valadez–Munoz v. Holder, 623 F.3d 1304, 1306–07, 1309 (9th Cir. 2010);
Valenzuela–Solari v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 53, 54 (1st Cir. 2008); Jamieson v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 765, 768 (8th Cir. 2005).
39
Compare Dwumaah v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 609 F.3d 586, 589 (3d Cir. 2010),
with Hassan v. Holder, 604 F.3d 915, 928–29 (6th Cir. 2010).
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falsely claiming U.S. citizenship on a federal student-loan application.40 In contrast, the Sixth Circuit held in Hassan v. Holder that a
noncitizen was not deportable for falsely claiming U.S. citizenship
on a Small Business Administration (“SBA”) loan application.41
The Third Circuit reconciled these seemingly conflicting holdings in Castro v. United States Attorney General.42 Examining the
loan applications at issue in Dwumaah and Hassan, the Third Circuit
recognized one key difference: “the relevance of the applicant’s citizenship status.”43 While U.S. citizenship was required to obtain the
federal student loan at issue in Dwumaah, the opposite was true of
the SBA loan at issue in Hassan.44 The Third Circuit thus recognized
that “the relevance of the [noncitizen]’s citizenship status” constrained the reach of the false-citizenship provisions.45 Applying this
analysis, the Third Circuit held that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) did
not apply to a noncitizen who falsely told state police he was a U.S.
citizen because “citizenship status had no bearing on the police department’s handling of his arrest.”46
In 2013, the Second Circuit joined the Third and Sixth Circuits
in tackling the false-citizenship provisions’ meaning. In Richmond
v. Holder, the Second Circuit recognized that “the statutory language cannot be read so broadly that it fails to exclude anything,”47
but “neither the parties, nor the BIA, nor the courts of appeals” had
yet “ma[de] clear the precise basis on which certain kinds of misrepresentations can be said to fall outside the requirement’s
scope.”48 Specifically, the court concluded that Hassan and Castro
had “left open the important question of whether the presence of a
‘purpose or benefit’ is determined objectively—based on whether
40

Dwumaah, 609 F.3d at 589.
Hassan, 604 F.3d at 928–29.
42
Castro v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 370–71 (3d Cir. 2012).
43
Id. at 370.
44
Id. Indeed, the Sixth Circuit itself recognized in Hassan that the government had not shown (1) “how, if at all, [the noncitizen]’s immigration status
would affect [his] loan application” or (2) that the noncitizen’s subjective purpose
in making the false claim was to affect his ability to receive the loan. Hassan, 604
F.3d at 928–29.
45
Castro, 671 F.3d at 370.
46
Id. at 370–71.
47
Richmond v. Holder, 714 F.3d 725, 729 (2d Cir. 2013).
48
Id. at 730.
41
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citizenship status would actually affect” the purpose or benefit, or
“subjectively, based on the effect that a non-citizen intends his or
her citizenship claim to have.”49 Because of the risk “that, in the
absence of some clear limitation on what [the provision’s scope] encompasses, the ‘purpose or benefit’ clause will itself serve no purpose, and provide no benefit, within the INA,”50 the Second Circuit
remanded to the BIA “to explain in the first instance” its understanding of the provision’s requirements.51
The Second Circuit’s remand prompted the BIA to issue Matter
of Richmond, a precedential decision interpreting the false-citizenship inadmissibility provision.52 In Matter of Richmond, the BIA examined federal-court decisions that had interpreted the false-citizenship provisions, including Castro, Hassan, and Dwumaah.53 As the
Third Circuit had done in Castro, the BIA recognized that “only in
Dwumaah was citizenship status a prerequisite to the loan’s approval—in other words, citizenship status actually affected the student loan application.”54
Synthesizing these decisions, the BIA held that a noncitizen’s
false-citizenship claim must meet two requirements to trigger inadmissibility.55 First, the noncitizen must have made the claim “with
the subjective intent of achieving a purpose or obtaining a benefit . . . .”56 “Second, the presence of a purpose or benefit must be
determined objectively—that is, the United States citizenship must
actually affect or matter to the purpose or benefit sought.”57 In other
words, the false-citizenship claim must have been material.58
49

Id.
Id.
51
Id. at 731 (“‘[W]e cannot comfortably ascertain the proper outcome in this
case in the absence of a set of standards’ to use in applying the statute; yet ‘were
we to generate standards ourselves, we would be forced to start essentially from
scratch’ . . . . [T]he better practice . . . is to remand to the BIA.” (quoting Liu v.
Gonzales, 455 F.3d 106, 116 (2d Cir. 2006))).
52
Matter of Richmond, 26 I. & N. Dec. 779, 783–89 (B.I.A. 2016).
53
Id. at 785–86.
54
Id. at 786.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 786–87.
58
The BIA ultimately ruled that the noncitizen’s false representation of U.S.
citizenship satisfied both requirements, and ordered the noncitizen removed. Id.
50
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III.
THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN PATEL
The Eleventh Circuit entered the interpretive fray in Patel v.
United States Attorney General.59 In Patel, the Eleventh Circuit rejected Matter of Richmond’s second requirement—that a false representation be material—as inconsistent with the statute’s plain
meaning.60
The lead petitioner in Patel, Pankajkumar Patel, had lived in the
United States for over twenty years before he was placed in removal
proceedings.61 For much of this time, Mr. Patel lived in Georgia, and
he had obtained several driver’s licenses under Georgia law.62 In
2008, Mr. Patel made a critical misstep when renewing his driver’s
license: He checked a box answering “Yes” to a question that asked
whether he was a U.S. citizen.63 This prompted the government to
deny Mr. Patel’s green-card application and to place him in removal
proceedings.64
In removal proceedings, Mr. Patel raised two defenses to inadmissibility under § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), tracking Matter of Richmond’s two-prong test.65 First, Mr. Patel testified that he checked
the U.S.-citizen box by mistake, and therefore lacked the subjective
intent to misrepresent his citizenship.66 Second, he argued that objectively, his misrepresentation was immaterial because he was eligible for a driver’s license under Georgia law regardless of his citizenship.67
at 789–90. On further review, the Second Circuit held that the BIA’s interpretation
of the statute was reasonable and entitled to deference. See Richmond v. Sessions,
697 F. App’x 106, 107 (2d Cir. 2017) (holding that, because “BIA’s reading is a
reasonable one and . . . the statute is ambiguous,” Second Circuit would “refrain
from replacing its reading with the one Richmond urges upon us”).
59
Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 917 F.3d 1319, 1332 (11th Cir. 2019), aff’d en
banc, 971 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2020).
60
Id.
61
Id. at 1322.
62
Id. at 1322–23.
63
Id. at 1323.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id. Under Georgia law at the time of Mr. Patel’s misrepresentation, “an
applicant who present[ed] in person valid documentary evidence of . . . other federal documentation verified by the United States Department of Homeland
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The immigration judge and the BIA rejected both arguments.
First, they disbelieved Mr. Patel’s testimony that he had unwittingly
checked the box, concluding instead that he had done so knowingly
for the purpose of obtaining a Georgia driver’s license.68 Second,
they held that the false representation was material because, in their
view, Mr. Patel would not have received a license had he disclosed
his actual immigration status.69
A three-judge panel of the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.70 The court
first held it lacked jurisdiction to consider Mr. Patel’s argument that
he lacked subjective intent.71 The court did, however, reach the merits of Mr. Patel’s second argument regarding materiality.72
Security to be valid documentary evidence of lawful presence in the United States
under federal immigration law” was eligible “to be issued a temporary license,
permit, or special identification card. See GA. CODE ANN. § 40-5-21.1(a) (2008)
(emphasis added). Moreover, an Employment Authorization Document, which
Mr. Patel held at the time, was sufficient to show such “lawful presence.” See
Information for Non US Citizens, GA. DEP’T OF DRIVER’S SERVS., https://web.archive.org/web/20081217105635/http://www.dds.ga.gov/drivers/DLdata.aspx?con=1741471757&ty=dl (archived Dec. 17, 2008) (listing an
employment authorization document as acceptable to “prove legal presence in the
[United States]”); Drivers from Other Nations, GA. DEP’T OF DRIVER SERVS.,
https://web.archive.org/web/20080627010530/http://www.dds.ga.gov/drivers/DLdata.aspx?con=1747371440&ty=dl (archived Feb. 17, 2008) (stating that
the Department of Driver Services would accept any valid document that authorizes a noncitizen to be present in the United States). That rule has since been codified in Georgia’s regulations. See GA. COMP. R. & REGS. § 375-3-1-.02(3)(e)
(2020) (noting that documents acceptable to establish identity of a customer seeking to renew a driver’s license include an “[u]nexpired employment authorization
document (EAD) issued by the DHS”).
68
Patel, 917 F.3d at 1323, 1327.
69
Id. As noted, this holding appears to have been incorrect, given that Georgia allowed applicants in Mr. Patel’s situation to obtain at least a temporary
driver’s license. See supra note 67. In fact, one BIA member dissented for exactly
this reason, recognizing that Mr. Patel “did not need citizenship to obtain the license” given that he would have qualified for a license based on his status as a
green-card applicant. See Patel, 917 F.3d at 1324; In re: Jyotsnaben P Patel
Pankajkumar Somabhai Patel Nishantkumar Patel, 2017 WL 1045537, at *4 (BIA
Jan. 17, 2017) (Wendtland, Board Member, dissenting).
70
Patel, 917 F.3d at 1332.
71
Id. at 1324. The court’s holding turned on its interpretation of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i). See id. That jurisdictional issue is beyond the scope of this
Article.
72
Id. at 1325–32.
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In a break with Matter of Richmond and the earlier circuit precedent on which that decision was based, the panel held that the falsecitizenship provisions include “no materiality element.”73 The statute, the panel observed, penalizes “false representation[s].”74 And a
person “can make a false representation with the goal of obtaining a
benefit, even if the false representation does not help them achieve
that goal.”75 The court therefore reasoned that the statute’s plain text
unambiguously excludes a materiality element.76
The panel opinion bolstered this interpretation by relying on
negative implication—the notion that “where Congress includes
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”77 The court observed that “Congress did include a materiality
element
in
the
immediately
preceding
subsection
[8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)], which says: ‘Any [noncitizen] who,
by fraud or willfully misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure . . . [an immigration benefit] is inadmissible.’”78 From this, the
panel inferred that Congress would have used the word “material”
in the false-citizenship provision had it intended the provision to
reach only material misrepresentations.79
The panel also found support for its holding in Kungys v. United
States.80
In Kungys, the Supreme Court analyzed
8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6), which provides that a person lacks “good
moral character” and is ineligible for naturalization if he or she “has
given false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under
[immigration law].”81 Like § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), the false-testimony provision at issue in Kungys does not use the word “material.”82 And the Kungys Court held that the false-testimony provision
“does not distinguish between material and immaterial
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82

Id. at 1328.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting Ela v. Destefano, 869 F.3d 1198, 1202 (11th Cir. 2017)).
Id. (emphasis added) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i)).
Id. (citing Destefano, 869 F.3d at 1202).
Id. at 1329 (discussing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 779 (1988)).
Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(6)).
Id.
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misrepresentations.”83 Observing that the texts of the two provisions
are “strikingly similar,” the Eleventh Circuit determined that
Kungys supported the court’s conclusion that § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)
also lacks a materiality requirement.84
The panel concluded by rejecting the BIA’s materiality holding
in Matter of Richmond as “flawed and unclear.”85 Moreover, the
panel determined that a materiality requirement is not necessary to
limit the statute’s reach to ensure it is not “read so broadly that it
fails to exclude anything.”86 Instead, the panel asserted that the statute’s “under Federal or State law” language was enough to limit its
reach: While “the text does not require that the purpose or benefit
sought be one restricted or available only to citizens,” the purpose
or benefit still must arise under the law.87 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit
held that the false-citizenship provision “does not require that citizenship be material to the purpose or benefit sought.”88
The Eleventh Circuit reheard Patel en banc, principally to decide
a jurisdictional issue unrelated to the materiality question.89 While
the court vacated the panel opinion when it agreed to rehear the case
en banc, the court’s en banc opinion summarily adopted the panel
opinion’s holding on materiality.90
IV.
WHY PATEL WAS WRONGLY DECIDED
As we will demonstrate below, the Eleventh Circuit’s holding
on materiality was wrong.91 But that is so principally for a reason
that neither the Eleventh Circuit nor any other court has yet considered: the common-law origins of the phrase “false representation.”
That phrase originates in the common law and carries with it a

83

Kungys, 485 U.S. at 779.
Patel, 917 F.3d at 1329.
85
Id. at 1331.
86
Id. at 1332 (quoting Matter of Richmond, 26 I. & N. Dec. 779, 784 (B.I.A.
2016)).
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 971 F.3d 1258, 1265 (11th Cir. 2020).
90
Id. at 1284 (“We need not disturb the panel’s ruling that the statute lacks a
materiality element.”).
91
See infra Part IV.
84
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materiality element.92 Thus, even though the false-citizenship provisions do not use the word “material,” they incorporate a materiality requirement by virtue of their use of common-law language.93
When viewed against this backdrop, none of the Eleventh Circuit’s
justifications for rejecting materiality withstands scrutiny.
A.

The Common-Law Meaning of “False Representation”
Carries a Materiality Element
A well-established canon of statutory interpretation holds that
“[w]here Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the common law, a court must infer, unless the statute
otherwise dictates, that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these terms.”94 Under this canon, a statute incorporates a materiality element if it uses language understood to include such an element at common law—even if the statute does not
explicitly use the word “material.”
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that the term “false representation”—or its equivalent “misrepresentation”95—is such a common-law term and, as a result, its usage “impl[ies] elements that the
common law has defined [it] to include.”96 One of the common-law
elements of a “false representation” is materiality;97 thus, the Supreme Court and numerous circuit courts have repeatedly understood statutes that use the term “false representation” to contain a
92

See supra Part I; infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.A.
94
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 21 (1999); NLRB v. Amax Coal Co.,
453 U.S. 322, 329 (1981).
95
“False representation” and “misrepresentation” are synonyms. See False
Representation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining the term by
way of cross reference to “misrepresentation”); Misrepresentation, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“misrepresentation” is “[a]lso termed false representation”).
96
Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 69 (1995). The inadmissibility and deportability grounds for false-citizenship representations were enacted just months after
the Supreme Court’s decision in Field. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 344(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-637. This proximity in time only strengthens
the presumption that Congress meant to incorporate the common-law meaning of
“false representation.” See id.; Field, 516 U.S. at 69.
97
United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 494 (1997) (a false “representation”
can imply “a materiality element” (citing Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759,
781 (1998))).
93
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materiality requirement, even when they do not use the word “material.”98
For example, in Fedorenko v. United States, the Supreme Court
interpreted a provision in the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 (the
“DPA”),99 which rendered inadmissible any “person who shall willfully make a misrepresentation for the purpose of gaining admission
into the United States.”100 Although the statute did not explicitly use
the word “material,” the Court held that the “provision only applies
to willful misrepresentations about ‘material’ facts.”101 As the Court
later explained, this “conclusion . . . was grounded in the word ‘misrepresentation,’ which has been held to [imply materiality] in many
contexts,” including at common law.102
The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Neder v.
United States, in which it interpreted the “federal mail fraud, wire
fraud, and bank fraud statutes.”103 These statutes prohibit obtaining
money or property “by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.”104 And they make no mention of the
word “material.” Nevertheless, the Court held that “materiality of
falsehood is an element” of these statutes, because of the commonlaw roots of the terms used in the statutes.105
Federal circuit courts, too, have recognized the common-law
meaning of “false representation.” For example, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act prohibits debt collectors from using “any false,
deceptive, or misleading representation” and identifies numerous

98

See., e.g., Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 507 (1981); Bryan v.
Credit Control, LLC, 954 F.3d 576, 582 (2d Cir. 2020); Jensen v. Pressler &
Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 421 (3d Cir. 2015); Powell v. Palisades Acquisition XVI,
LLC, 782 F.3d 119, 126 (4th Cir. 2014); Van Hoven v. Buckles & Buckles,
P.L.C., 947 F.3d 889, 894 (6th Cir. 2020); Hahn v. Triumph P’ships LLC, 557
F.3d 755, 757 (7th Cir. 2009); Hill v. Accts. Receivable Servs., LLC, 888 F.3d
343, 346 (8th Cir. 2018); Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1033
(9th Cir. 2010).
99
Displaced Persons Act (“DPA”), Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, 1013
(1948).
100
Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 495, 507–08 (quoting DPA § 10, 62 Stat. at 1013).
101
Id. at 507 (emphasis added).
102
Kungys, 485 U.S. at 781.
103
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999).
104
18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1344.
105
Neder, 527 U.S. at 25.
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“false representations” that violate the law.106 These statutes do not
use the word “material.” Yet numerous circuits have held that a false
statement must be material to be actionable under the statute.107 This
is in line with the well-established meaning of “false representation”
in the common-law tort context.108
Because the false-citizenship provisions similarly use the language of “false representation,” they too incorporate materiality.
The Eleventh Circuit never grappled with this point in either the
panel opinion or the en banc decision reaffirming the panel’s holding.109 Had it done so, the court would have recognized that, contrary to its decision, the false-citizenship provisions include a materiality element.

106

15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
See, e.g., Bryan v. Credit Control, LLC, 954 F.3d 576, 582 (2d Cir. 2020)
(“[W]e have held that . . . only material errors violate Section 1692e.”); Jensen v.
Pressler & Pressler, 791 F.3d 413, 421 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[A] false statement . . . must be material . . . .”); Powell v. Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC, 782
F.3d 119, 126 (4th Cir. 2014) (“A logical corollary of the least sophisticated consumer test is that false, deceptive, and misleading statements must be material to
be actionable.”); Van Hoven v. Buckles & Buckles, P.L.C., 947 F.3d 889, 894
(6th Cir. 2020) (“One [requirement] is that a claim must turn on a material misstatement.”); Hahn v. Triumph P’ships LLC, 557 F.3d 755, 757 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“Materiality is an ordinary element of any federal claim based on a false or misleading statement.”); Hill v. Accts. Receivable Servs., LLC, 888 F.3d 343, 346
(8th Cir. 2018) (“[A] false but non-material statement is not actionable.”);
Donohue v. Quick Collect, Inc., 592 F.3d 1027, 1033 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A] false
or misleading statement is not actionable under § 1692e unless it is material.”).
108
See, e.g., Christidis v. First Pa. Mortg. Tr., 717 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1983)
(describing “an action for false representation” as requiring demonstration of a
“specific false representation of material facts” (quoting CHARLES C. CLARK,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING § 48 (2d ed. 1947))); Palmacci v.
Umpierrez, 121 F.3d 781, 786 (1st Cir. 1997) (identifying the elements of “the
common law tort of false representation” as including materiality concepts); In re
Hardin, 458 F.2d 938, 940 (7th Cir. 1972) (recognizing that “[t]he Wisconsin
common law of false representations, similar to that of most states,” required a
showing that the false representation was material to aggrieved party).
109
See Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 917 F.3d 1319, 1332 (11th Cir. 2019), aff’d
en banc, 971 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2020); Patel, 971 F.3d at 1284.
107
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B.

The Eleventh Circuit’s Reliance on Negative Implication
Was Misplaced
In holding that the false-citizenship provisions lack a materiality
element, the Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on the negative-implication canon, which dictates that “where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section
of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposefully in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”110
As discussed in Part III, the court applied this canon by comparing the false-citizenship provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) to
the
neighboring
generic-misrepresentation
provision
at
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(i).111 Unlike the false-citizenship provision, the generic-misrepresentation provision explicitly includes a materiality
element by stating that any noncitizen “who, by fraud or willfully
misrepresenting a material fact, seeks to procure . . . [an immigration benefit] is inadmissible.”112 Because it could not find “persuasive evidence to the contrary,” the court reasoned that Congress’s
use of the word “material” in the generic-misrepresentation provision reflected its intent not to incorporate a materiality element into
the false-citizenship provision.113
But the Eleventh Circuit was wrong to rely on negative implication because the Supreme Court has held that the common-law language canon takes precedence over the negative-implication
canon.114 As the Court has stated, negative implication is “weakest”
when pitted against “common-law language at work in [a] statute.”115 In fact, the Court has expressly declined to apply the negative-implication canon to strip the words “false representation” or
“misrepresentation” of their common-law materiality element because Congress’s “drafting choice” not to enumerate the elements
implied in common-law language does not “deprive” those

110

Ela v. Destefano, 869 F.3d 1198, 1202 (11th Cir. 2017) (quoting Duncan
v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 173 (2001)); Patel, 917 F.3d at 1328.
111
See supra Part III.
112
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (emphasis added).
113
Patel, 917 F.3d at 1328.
114
See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 75–76 (1995).
115
Id. (rejecting the negative-implication inference because of the commonlaw language at play in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)).
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common-law phrases “of a significance richer than the bare statement of their terms.”116
The panel also wrongly relied on Kungys.117 While the Supreme
Court held that “false testimony” did not incorporate a materiality
requirement, it explicitly noted that “false testimony” was not a
common-law term.118 Yet the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that the term “false representation” originates in the common
law and carries a materiality requirement with it.119 Accordingly, the
Eleventh Circuit was wrong to hold that “false representation” excludes a materiality element.120
As discussed above, the Eleventh Circuit never addressed the
meaning of “false representation” under the common law.121 If it
had, it would have recognized that the provisions’ common-law language takes precedence over negative implication122 and is “persuasive evidence” overriding any such negative implication.123 Because
“false representation” includes materiality, the Eleventh Circuit
should have relied on “the rule that Congress intends to incorporate
the well-settled meaning of the common-law terms it uses.”124 Thus,
the Eleventh Circuit could not simply “infer from the absence of an
express reference to materiality that Congress intended to drop that
element” from § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I).125 Instead, it should have
“presume[d] that Congress intended to incorporate materiality ‘unless the statute otherwise dictates.’”126 Because nothing in
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) “dictates” otherwise,127 the statute must be
construed to incorporate materiality, and the Eleventh Circuit was
wrong to adopt a contrary reading.

116

Id. at 69.
Patel, 917 F.3d at 1329.
118
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 781 (1988) (emphasis added).
119
See supra Part IV.A.
120
See Patel, 917 F.3d at 1329.
121
Kungys, 485 U.S. at 781.
122
See Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 75–76 (1995).
123
See Patel, 917 F.3d at 1328.
124
Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 23 (1999).
125
Id.
126
Id. (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322
(1992)).
127
Id.
117
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The Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on the negative-implication
canon is flawed for several other reasons.
First, although § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i) (the generic misrepresentation
inadmissibility provision) and § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) (the false-citizenship inadmissibility provision) are adjacent in the U.S. Code, they
were enacted more than forty years apart. The generic misrepresentation provision traces its roots to the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952.128 The false-citizenship provision, by contrast, was not
enacted until 1996.129 This four-decade gap erodes any negative-implication inference as “‘negative implications raised by disparate
provisions are strongest’ in those instances in which the relevant
statutory provisions were ‘considered simultaneously when the language raising the implication was inserted.’”130
The force of negative implication is further diminished because
the language and structure of the two provisions are not closely parallel. As the Supreme Court has explained, the presumption “grows
weaker with each difference in the formulation of the provisions under inspection.”131 Here, the generic misrepresentation provision, in
relevant part, bears little resemblance to the false-citizenship
128

See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 414, § 212(a)(6)(C)(i),
66 Stat. 163, 183 (1952) (rendering inadmissible “[a]ny [noncitizen] who seeks to
procure, or has sought to procure, or has procured a visa or other documentation,
or seeks to enter the United States, by fraud, or by willfully mispresenting a material fact”).
129
See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 344(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-637.
130
Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 486 (2008) (quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330 (1997)) (declining to apply presumption to provisions enacted seven years apart). Notably, Congress has never enacted a similar genericmisrepresentation provision to the deportability grounds of the INA. See
8 U.S.C. § 1227. Thus, the negative-implication argument cannot logically apply
to the false-citizenship deportability provision at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D). And
because the false-citizenship deportability provision was enacted at the same time
as the false-citizenship inadmissibility provision at § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), see supra
notes 28–33 and accompanying text, the court’s reliance on the negative-implication canon in this context is especially weak.
131
Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 75–76 (explaining how the negative implication canon is “strong[est]” when applied to “contrasting statutory sections originally enacted simultaneously” and “weakest when it suggests results strangely at
odds with other textual pointers, like . . . common-law language”); see also City
of Columbus v. Ours Garage & Wrecker Serv., Inc., 536 U.S. 424, 435–36 (2002)
(stating that the case for “inference” from negative implication is “more persuasive” when “the [relevant] omission [is] the sole difference”).

2021]

DOES IT REALLY MATTER?

1233

provision. In fact, given the phrasing of the false-citizenship provision, the word “material” cannot be inserted anywhere in a way that
renders the provision both grammatically and semantically accurate.
For example, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that Congress could
have expressly incorporated materiality by inserting the word “material” before the phrase “purpose or benefit,” so that the provision
would read as follows: “Any [noncitizen] who falsely represents . . . himself or herself to be a citizen of the United States for
any [material] purpose or benefit under this chapter . . . or any other
Federal or State law is inadmissible.”132 But in that hypothetical formulation, the word “material” modifies the wrong concept; it is not
the “purpose or benefit” under federal or state law that must be “material” but the false representation of U.S. citizenship that must be
material to the purpose or benefit.133 Because the two provisions are
structurally dissimilar, the negative-implication canon’s force is especially weak.134
For these reasons, the negative-implication canon is of little
value in interpreting the false-citizenship provisions.
C.

The Context and Purpose of the False-Citizenship
Provisions Support a Materiality Requirement
The Eleventh Circuit’s reliance on Kungys was based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Supreme Court’s decision. While
132
Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 917 F.3d 1319, 1328 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)), aff’d en banc, 971 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2020).
133
See id. (emphasis added).
134
Notably, while the panel highlighted the mismatch in use of the word “material” across subsections (a)(6)(C)(i) and (a)(6)(C)(ii)(I), it ignored a similar mismatch within subsection (a)(6)(C)(i) itself. By its plain terms, the generic-misrepresentation provision reaches two kinds of conduct: (1) “fraud,” and (2) “willfully
misrepresenting a material fact.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(i). If negative implication overrides common-law language, then “fraud” would contain no materiality
element because the word “material” does not modify “fraud.” But “fraud” under
the provision has long been held to incorporate a materiality element. See OrtizBouchet v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 714 F.3d 1353, 1356 (11th Cir. 2013) (per curiam)
(“[T]he BIA has held that fraud [under this provision] ‘consist[s] of false representations of a material fact made with knowledge of its falsity and with intent to
deceive the other party.’” (third alteration in original) (quoting Matter of G–G–,
7 I. & N. Dec. 161, 164 (B.I.A. 1956))). Thus, the panel’s reasoning would lead
to a construction of the generic-misrepresentation provision that is at odds with
its longstanding meaning.
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the Eleventh Circuit believed that Kungys “bolster[ed]” its reading
of the false-citizenship provision,135 in truth Kungys undermines it.
The false-testimony provision addressed in Kungys states that
“[n]o person shall be regarded as, or found to be, a person of good
moral character who, during the period for which good moral character is required to be established is, or was . . . one who has given
false testimony for the purpose of obtaining any benefits under this
chapter.”136 In Kungys, the Supreme Court refused to read in a materiality requirement to this provision, in part because the provision
was “part of a definition of what constitutes a lack of ‘good moral
character’ for purposes of qualifying for immigration.”137 According to the Supreme Court, this language was very different from provisions previously found to contain an implicit materiality element.138
For example, provisions like the inadmissibility provision at issue in Fedorenko have the purpose “to punish and thereby deter misrepresentation in the immigration process.”139 A materiality limitation makes sense in a provision like this one, designed to punish and
deter, especially considering the common-law meaning of the word
“misrepresentation.”140 In contrast, the purpose of the false-testimony provision at issue in Kungys was to “identify lack of good
moral character,” which “appears to some degree whenever there is
a subjective intent to deceive, no matter how immaterial the deception.”141 Thus, imposing a materiality requirement on the false-testimony provision made little sense. This was especially true considering the provision was sufficiently limited and applied only to “oral

135

Patel, 917 F.3d at 1329.
8 U.S.C. § 1101(f), 1101(f)(6).
137
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 782 (1988).
138
Id. at 780–82.
139
Id. at 780, 782 (stating that the purpose of the provision at issue in Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981), was “to prevent false pertinent
data from being introduced into the naturalization process (and to correct the result of the proceedings where that has occurred)”).
140
Id. at 781.
141
Id. at 780. Noncitizens are required to show “good moral character” as an
explicit part of many immigration applications, including naturalization, see 8
U.S.C. § 1427(a), and cancellation of removal for non-lawful permanent residents, see id. § 1229b(b)(1)(B).
136
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statements made under oath . . . with the subjective intent of obtaining immigration benefits.”142
Contrary to the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion, the false-citizenship
provision at issue in Patel is more closely aligned with the inadmissibility provision in Fedorenko than the false-testimony provision in
Kungys. Congress enacted the false-citizenship provisions to discourage noncitizens from evading employment-verification laws or
“‘abus[ing] . . . the welfare system’ through fraudulent applications
for public benefits.”143 Congress was, in other words, concerned
with preventing noncitizens from making false citizenship-claims to
obtain benefits they were ineligible to receive. This is precisely the
sort of legislative purpose for which a materiality requirement is
most appropriate.144
On the other hand, the provision is decidedly unlike the false-testimony provision at issue in Kungys. Not only does the false-citizenship provision—unlike the false-testimony provision—contain
common-law language that traditionally requires materiality, but it
has also been held to cover even noncitizens who genuinely believe
they are U.S. citizens. In other words, the false-citizenship provision
has been held to apply to noncitizens who—unlike those found to
lack good moral character under the false-testimony provision—
have engaged in no willful deception or any other morally culpable
conduct.145
142

Kungys, 485 U.S. at 780.
Castro v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 356, 368–69 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing
legislative history).
144
See Kungys, 485 U.S. at 780, 782 (explaining that a materiality requirement
makes sense for statutes enacted “to prevent false pertinent data from being introduced” or “to punish and thereby deter misrepresentation”). The Eleventh Circuit
was therefore mistaken to suggest that “[a]pplying the statute even when citizenship is immaterial advances the legislation’s purpose.” See 917 F.3d at 1331. “No
law pursues its purpose at all costs,” Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 752
(2006), and the statutory context here suggests Congress was especially concerned
with people claiming U.S. citizenship to obtain benefits reserved for U.S. citizens,
see supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text.
145
See Matter of Zhang, 27 I. & N. Dec. 569, 571 (B.I.A. 2019) (holding that
a noncitizen “is not required to know that a claim to citizenship is false” to be
found inadmissible or deportable under the false-citizenship provisions). The validity of the BIA’s holding in Zhang is beyond the scope of this Article. But one
key point deserves attention: There is a difference between knowledge that a
143
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Accordingly, the statutory context and purpose strongly support
the materiality element Congress included through its use of common-law language.
D.

Ambiguity in Immigration Statutes Must Be Resolved in
Favor of Noncitizens
The Eleventh Circuit should have resolved any remaining doubt
as to whether the false-citizenship provisions incorporate a materiality element by applying the principle that removal statutes must be
narrowly construed in favor of noncitizens.146 This principle has
special force when interpreting inadmissibility or deportability
grounds that carry particularly harsh consequences.
representation of U.S. citizenship was made at all and knowledge that such a representation was false. While the BIA in Zhang held that the latter is not required
under the false-citizenship provision, the earlier unquestionably is required because the provision’s plain language triggers inadmissibility only if made “for”
some “purpose or benefit” under federal or state law. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)
(emphasis added). Because “the word ‘for’ is a function used to indicate purpose,
an intended goal, or the object of an activity,” a person who inadvertently represents himself as a U.S. citizen falls outside the false-citizenship provision’s
reach—such a person cannot logically intend that his accidental citizenship representation serve a purpose or benefit. Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 917 F.3d 1319,
1328 (11th Cir. 2019), aff’d en banc, 971 F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2020); see also
Lawson v. Fortis Ins. Co., 301 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2002) (“The word ‘for’
connotes intent.”).
The Eleventh Circuit’s panel opinion confused this distinction by suggesting that § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I) incorporates no knowledge requirement of any kind
because, if it did, the narrow exception for certain noncitizens who “reasonably
believed” they were U.S. citizens “would [be] render[ed] superfluous.” Patel, 917
F.3d at 1326; see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(II) (exempting noncitizens whose
parents are or were U.S. citizens, who “resided in the United States prior to attaining the age of 16,” and who “reasonably believed at the time of making such
representation that he or she was a citizen”). But that exception deals not with
inadvertent representations of U.S. citizenship, but rather with knowing ones
made without knowledge of their falsity. Thus, interpreting § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(I)
to require knowledge that a representation of U.S. citizenship was made at all,
consistent with the provision’s use of the word “for,” would not render the
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(II) exception surplusage.
146
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987); see also INS v. St.
Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 320 (2001); Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019)
(recognizing that “a court must exhaust all the ‘traditional tools’ of construction”
before finding ambiguity (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984))).
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And the false-citizenship provisions are undoubtedly harsh—so
harsh, in fact, they have been described as “the ‘immigrant version
of the death penalty.’”147 Unlike many other removal grounds, the
false-citizenship provisions are not waivable.148 A noncitizen generally “is not required to know that a claim to citizenship is false” to
trigger inadmissibility or deportability.149 The only exception applies to noncitizens who (1) “permanently resided in the United
States prior to attaining the age of 16,” (2) have two U.S.-citizen
parents, and (3) “reasonably believed . . . he or she was a citizen”
when the false statement was made.150 A noncitizen who does not
fall under this narrow exception will be permanently barred from
entering or re-entering the United States if they are found to be inadmissible or deportable under the false-citizenship provisions.151
The provisions’ unwaivable bar resembles the consequences of aggravated felony offenses like murder or drug trafficking.152 Thus,
without a materiality requirement, the false-citizenship provisions
would “produce draconian results.”153

147

Munoz-Avila v. Holder, 716 F.3d 976, 978 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating that 8
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) “has been characterized as the ‘immigrant version of
the death penalty,’ because [it] cannot be waived by the Attorney General and
therefore operates as a permanent bar” (quoting Sandoval v. Holder, 641 F.3d 982,
984–85 (8th Cir. 2011))); see also Dakura v. Holder, 772 F.3d 994, 998 (4th Cir.
2014).
148
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(iii) (authorizing waiver for clause (i), but not
clause (ii)); § 1127(a)(1)(H) (same); § 1227(a)(3)(D); see also Patel, 917 F.3d at
1329; Godfrey v. Lynch, 811 F.3d 1013, 1019 (8th Cir. 2016) (recognizing that
there is no waiver for falsely claiming U.S. citizenship to obtain a benefit under
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)).
149
Matter of Zhang, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 571 (emphasis added).
150
8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(f), 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)(II), 1227(a)(3)(D)(ii). This exception almost exclusively applies to foreign-born children who were adopted by U.S.
citizens and did not realize they still needed to naturalize to become U.S. citizens.
Sandoval, 641 F.3d at 986.
151
See Patel, 917 F.3d at 1329; Munoz-Avila, 716 F.3d at 978; Sandoval, 641
F.3d at 984–85; Dakura, 772 F.3d at 998.
152
See Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder, 560 U.S. 563, 566 (2010) (stating that
the designation “aggravated felony” under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) consists of “a
category of crimes singled out for the harshest deportation consequences”).
153
See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 780 (1988) (declining to read
a materiality element into § 1101(f)(6) in part because “[a] literal reading of the
statute does not produce draconian results”).
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The precedential BIA decision in Matter of Zhang illustrates the
statute’s breadth.154 In that case, a noncitizen unlawfully obtained a
Certificate of Naturalization from a former immigration officer, then
used that Certificate to apply for a U.S. passport.155 After he was
placed in removal proceedings and charged as deportable under
8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D), the noncitizen argued that he was not deportable because he believed he was a U.S. citizen when he obtained
the Certificate of Naturalization and, thus, applied for the U.S. passport in good faith.156 This argument required the BIA to decide
whether a noncitizen’s “false claim to United States citizenship must
be made knowingly to render him or her removable.”157 The BIA
determined that it did not.158 Because the noncitizen had made the
false claim of citizenship when applying for a U.S. passport (undeniably a “benefit” under federal law),159 the BIA determined that he
was deportable under the false-citizenship provision regardless of
whether he genuinely believed he was a U.S. citizen.160
Without a materiality element, the false-citizenship provisions
will thus lead to draconian outcomes. For example, imagine a person
held a U.S. passport and genuinely believed he was a U.S. citizen.
He obtained a New York driver’s license and, on the application, he
indicated that he was a U.S. citizen. Then, the U.S. government
placed him in removal proceedings and charged him as removable
for making a false claim of U.S. citizenship on his driver’s license
application after it discovered that the noncitizen was not, in fact, a
U.S. citizen.161 In New York, even undocumented immigrants are
154

Matter of Zhang, 27 I. & N. Dec. at 572.
Id. at 569–70.
156
Id. at 570.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 572 (“[U]nder the plain language of that section, it is not necessary
to show intent to establish that a[ noncitizen] is deportable for making a false
representation of United States citizenship. A[ noncitizen] need only falsely claim
to be a United States citizen for any purpose or benefit under the Act or any Federal or State law to be deportable.”).
159
See, e.g., Sowah v. Gonzales, 196 F. App’x 576, 577 (9th Cir. 2006).
160
Id.
161
While this example may sound far-fetched, the extraordinary complexities
of naturalization law relating to the acquisition and derivation of U.S. citizenship
at birth, among other things, make this concern all too real. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1401–
1409, 1431, 1433. To provide just one example, the U.S. government has
155
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eligible for a driver’s license,162 so a materiality requirement would
protect such a person from being deported for answering a wholly
irrelevant citizenship question in a manner he believed to be truthful.
Under the Eleventh Circuit’s contrary reading, however, such a person would be deportable and permanently barred from residing in
the United States based on an innocent mistake (indeed, for answering a question in a manner he genuinely believed to be truthful) that
led to no benefit at all.
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit’s assertion that the “under Federal or
State law” language in the false-citizenship provisions adequately
limits the provisions’ reach is misguided.163 That language limits
only the type of “purpose or benefit” covered by the provisions: It
must be a purpose or benefit provided under the law. But that language leaves open the reality that, under the Eleventh Circuit’s reading, a noncitizen could be permanently removed from the United
States for unknowingly making a false claim of U.S. citizenship for
any type of purpose or benefit under the law—even if the noncitizen
would have been eligible for the benefit regardless of their citizenship status. This does not comport with Congress’s intent in enacting
the false-citizenship provisions: “to address abuse in the employment verification process by [noncitizens], as well as the fraud and

questioned the citizenship status of many persons who were birthed with the assistance of a midwife in the Rio Grande Valley of Texas, and the government has
revoked passports or refused to issue passports to such persons, even absent any
evidence of fraud or misrepresentation. See, e.g., Martinez v. Sec’y of State, 652
F. App’x 758, 759–61 (11th Cir. 2016); Eva Garcia Mendoza, Immigration Judge
vs. Passport Agency – the Battle Over Mario’s Citizenship Is Finally Over, THINK
IMMIG. BLOG (Jan. 28, 2020), https://thinkimmigration.org/blog/2020/01/28/immigration-judge-vs-passport-agency-the-battle-over-marios-citizenship-is-finally-over/; Kevin Sieff, U.S. Is Denying Passports to Americans Along the Border, Throwing Their Citizenship into Question, WASH. POST (Sept. 13, 2018, 6:18
PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/us-is-denying-passports-to-americans-along-the-border-throwing-their-citizenship-into-question/2018/08/29/1d630e84-a0da-11e8-a3dd-2a1991f075d5_story.html.
162
See N.Y. VEH. & TRAFF. LAW §§ 201(f)(12), 502(c), 502(e).
163
Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 917 F.3d 1319, 1331 (11th Cir. 2019) (quoting
Matter of Richmond, 26 I. & N. Dec. 779, 784 (B.I.A. 2016)), aff’d en banc, 971
F.3d 1258 (11th Cir. 2020).
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abuse committed by illegal [noncitizens] to obtain public services
and benefits that are limited to United States citizens.”164
Accordingly, reading the false-citizenship provisions to include
a materiality element, consistent with the Supreme Court’s focus on
common-law language the provisions deploy, adds an important
limiting principle and accords with “the longstanding principle of
construing any lingering ambiguities in deportation statutes in favor
of the [noncitizen].”165
CONCLUSION
In holding that no materiality is required under the false-citizenship provisions, the Eleventh Circuit ignored the provisions’ common-law language, broke with the provisions’ precedential interpretations, and enabled the U.S. government to subject noncitizens to
the “immigrant version of the death penalty”166 for innocent conduct
that results in no benefit to the noncitizen. While the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Patel is binding on immigration courts and BIA
decisions within its jurisdiction, its weight is merely persuasive in
other courts; for the reasons explained in this Article, other circuits
can and should reject Patel when interpreting the false-citizenship
provisions.167
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Matter of Richmond, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 783 (citing legislative history of
the false-citizenship provisions).
165
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987).
166
Munoz-Avila v. Holder, 716 F.3d 976, 978 (7th Cir. 2013).
167
Matter of Anselmo, 20 I. & N. Dec. 25, 31 (B.I.A. 1989) (“We are not
required to accept an adverse determination by one circuit court of appeals as
binding throughout the United States. Where we disagree with a court’s position
on a given issue, we decline to follow it outside the court’s circuit. But, we have
historically followed a court’s precedent in cases arising in that circuit.” (first citing Ga. Dep’t of Med. Assistance v. Bowen, 846 F.2d 708, 710 (11th Cir. 1988);
then citing Ry. Lab. Execs.’ Ass’n v. I.C.C., 784 F.2d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 1986);
and then citing Generali v. D’Amico, 766 F.2d 485, 489 (11th Cir. 1985))).

